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An Introduction To The Theory Of Mechanism Design


Author : Tilman Borgers
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Release Date : 2015



Download An Introduction To The Theory Of Mechanism Design written by Tilman Borgers and has been published by Oxford University Press, USA this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with Business & Economics categories.


This book is meant for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics who have a good understanding of game theory.

An Introduction To The Theory Of Mechanism Design


Author : Tilman Borgers
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2015-05-01



Download An Introduction To The Theory Of Mechanism Design written by Tilman Borgers and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015-05-01 with Business & Economics categories.


What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman B?rgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. B?rgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.

An Introduction To The Theory Of Mechanism Design


Author : Tilman Borgers
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2015-05-01



Download An Introduction To The Theory Of Mechanism Design written by Tilman Borgers and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015-05-01 with Business & Economics categories.


What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman B?rgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. B?rgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.

Game Theory And Mechanism Design


Author : Y Narahari
language : en
Publisher: World Scientific
Release Date : 2014-03-13



Download Game Theory And Mechanism Design written by Y Narahari and has been published by World Scientific this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-03-13 with Computers categories.


This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the “science” behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society. The importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sciences being awarded to game theorists, including the 2005, 2007, and 2012 prizes. The book distills the marvelous contributions of these and other celebrated game theorists and presents it in a way that can be easily understood even by senior undergraduate students. A unique feature of the book is its detailed coverage of mechanism design which is the art of designing a game among strategic agents so that a social goal is realized in an equilibrium of the induced game. Another feature is a large number of illustrative examples that are representative of both classical and modern applications of game theory and mechanism design. The book also includes informative biographical sketches of game theory legends, and is specially customized to a general engineering audience. After a thorough reading of this book, readers would be able to apply game theory and mechanism design in a principled and mature way to solve relevant problems in computer science (esp, artificial intelligence/machine learning), computer engineering, operations research, industrial engineering and microeconomics. Contents:Introduction and OverviewNon-Cooperative Game Theory:Key Notions in Game TheoryExtensive Form GamesStrategic Form GamesDominant Strategy EquilibriaPure Strategy Nash EquilibriaMixed Strategies and Mixed Strategy Nash EquilibriumUtility TheoryMatrix GamesExistence of Nash EquilibriumComputation of Nash EquilibriaComplexity of Computing a Nash EquilibriumBayesian GamesMechanism Design:Introduction to Mechanism DesignImplementation of Social Choice Functions by MechanismsIncentive Compatibility and Revelation TheoremThe Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility TheoremVickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) MechanismsMechanism Design Space in Quasilinear EnvironmentAuctionsOptimal Mechanisms and Myerson AuctionMechanism Design for Sponsored Search AuctionsImplementation in Ex-Post Nash EquilibriumFurther Topics in Mechanism DesignCooperative Game Theory:Correlated Strategies and Correlated EquilibriumThe Two Person Bargaining ProblemCoalitional Games with Transferable UtilityThe Core of Coalitional GamesThe Shapley ValueOther Solution Concepts in Cooperative Game TheoryStable MatchingEpilogueMathematical Preliminaries Readership: Senior undergraduate, first year master's, and first year research students, academics and industrial researchers in computer science, computer engineering, networks and communications, artificial intelligence/machine learning, operations research, industrial engineering, management science, and microeconomics. Keywords:Game Theory;Mechanism Design;Noncooperative Game Theory;Nash EquilibriumKey Features:First of its kind to include a balanced treatment of noncooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, as well as mechanism designIncorporates a large number of apt, illustrative examples to facilitate an immediate and comprehensive understanding of the concepts and ideasExamples chosen carefully from traditional and modern topics in computer science, networks, and microeconomicsIncludes biographical sketches of leading game theorists at appropriate placesReviews: “I am very pleased that Y Narahari has written this lovely text, which presents the fundamentals of game theory and mechanism design clearly and concisely. In doing so, Dr Narahari has performed a great service to students and researchers interested in the lively interface between engineering sciences and economics.” Professor Eric Maskin Harvard University Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences, 2007 “The theory of Games and Mechanism Design find today wide applications in Economics, Engineering, and Operations Research. This is one of the few books which present a detailed account of both Non-Cooperative and Cooperative Games as well as Mechanism Design, all under one cover. Proofs of important theorems are given in a clear and succinct manner and the bibliographical and biographical references are particularly valuable. The book can serve both as a graduate text as well as a reference volume. I highly recommend it.” Sanjoy K Mitter Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA “This is a splendid book for engineers by an engineer. It has the ideal choice of topics and emphasis that reflects the driving themes in game theory, such as mechanism design, that have lead the revival of game theory in recent times and its multifarious applications in cybercommerce and allied areas. The lucidly written byte-sized chapters rich with examples and historical details make it an exciting read. This is the right book at the right time.” Vivek Borkar Indian Institute of Technology-Bombay, Mumbai, India “This book covers a subject which now straddles at least three subjects — Economics, Mathematics and Computer Science. It is a comprehensive presentation for a wide range of readers from the novice to experts in related areas who want to inform themselves of Game Theory and Mechanism Design. The book has a very readable from-first-principles approach to topics which commendably illuminates while not sacrificing rigor.” Ravi Kannan Microsoft Research and Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India “Narahari's book is a beautifully written text that handles both introductory material and advanced topics well.” Preston McAfee Google, Mountain View, CA, USA “This marvelous book on Game Theory and Mechanism Design is an essential reference for beginners and practitioners alike. The book covers the basic concepts needed to understand game theory and powerful practical implications of the theory embodied in mechanism design. Narahari excels at elucidating the essentials of game theory, while motivating the reader with a number of illustrative examples and real-world applications from engineering, economics and networks. It is fun to read and should be on the shelf of any student or practitioner interested in the practical applications of game theory.” Krishna Pattipati University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA “Game Theory is the formal analysis of strategic behavior. It originated with the classic book of von Neumann and Morgenstern in the 1940's and over the last 70 years, has become a vital ingredient in both the social and engineering sciences. Professor Narahari is a leading expert in the burgeoning area of game theoretic applications to computer science. His lucid and elegant book, packed with examples and historical background, is a wonderful introduction to modern Game Theory. It clearly lays out the central concepts and results of the theory while conveying its potential for providing insights to a range of interesting practical problems. The book will be invaluable to students from diverse backgrounds such as economics, mathematics, and engineering.” Arunava Sen Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India “Game Theory and Mechanism Design is impressive in its broad coverage of cooperative games, non-cooperative games and mechanism design from an engineering perspective. The book is rich in examples and exercises, and couples historical appraisals of the evolution of the field with careful mathematical proofs. It should be valuable both as a graduate text and for reference.” Chris Dance Xerox Research Centre Europe, Grenoble, France

An Introduction To Auction Theory


Author : Flavio M. Menezes
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Release Date : 2005



Download An Introduction To Auction Theory written by Flavio M. Menezes and has been published by Oxford University Press, USA this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with Business & Economics categories.


The practical importance of auction theory is widely recognized. Indeed, economists have been recognized for their contribution to the design of several auction-like mechanisms, such as the U. S. Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions, the 3G auctions in Europe and beyond, and the auction markets for electricity markets around the world. This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of the theory of auctions. The aim is to provide an introductory textbook that will allow students and readers with a calculus background to work through all the basic results. Coverage includes: the basic independent-private-model; the effects of introducing correlation in valuations on equilibrium behaviour and the seller's expected revenue; mechanism design; and the theory of multi-object auctions. The paperback edition of the text includes a new chapter which acts as a guide to current developments in auction theory.

Game Theory


Author : Steven Tadelis
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2013



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"Steve Tadelis's Game Theory is an ideal textbook for advanced undergraduates, and great preparation for graduate work. It provides a clear, self-contained, and rigorous treatment of all the key concepts, along with interesting applications; it also introduces key technical tools in a straightforward and intuitive way."--Drew Fudenberg, Harvard University "Steven Tadelis is a leading scholar in applied game theory, and his expertise shines through in this excellent new text. Aimed at intermediate to advanced undergraduates, it presents and discusses the theory remarkably clearly, at both the intuitive and formal levels. One novel feature I like is its serious consideration of the decision theoretic foundations of game theory. Another is its transparent presentation of relatively recent topics and applications, such as reputations in asymmetric information games, legislative bargaining, and cheap talk communication."--Steve Matthews, University of Pennsylvania "Steve Tadelis has written an up-to-date, comprehensive, yet reader-friendly introductory textbook to game theory. He explains difficult concepts in an exceptionally clear and simple way, making the book accessible to students with a minimal background in mathematics. The abundance of examples and illustrations, drawing from economics, political science, and business strategy, not only shows the wide range of applications of game theory, but also makes the book attractive and fun to read. Tadelis's book will undoubtedly become a reference textbook for a first course in game theory."--Francis Bloch, ecole Polytechnique "These days, game theory plays an essential role not only in economics, but in many other branches of social and engineering science, as well as philosophy, biology, psychology, even law. In all these disciplines, students and instructors alike should welcome this excellent resource for mastering the key tools of modern game theory."--Peter Hammond, University of Warwick "It's hard to write a game theory textbook that strikes a good balance between precision and accessibility. But Steve Tadelis has accomplished this juggling act, with style and humor besides."--Eric S. Maskin, Nobel Laureate in Economics, Harvard University "Game theory is a powerful tool for understanding strategic behavior in business, politics, and other settings. Steve Tadelis's text provides an ideal guide, taking you from first principles of decision theory to models of bargaining, auctions, signaling, and reputation building in a style that is both rigorous and reader-friendly."--Jonathan Levin, Stanford University "Game Theory fills a void in the literature, serving as a text for an advanced undergraduate--or masters-level class. It has more detail than most undergraduate texts, while still being accessible to a broad audience and stopping short of the more technical approach of PhD-level texts. This is a valuable book, written by a meticulous scholar who is an expert in the field."--Matthew O. Jackson, author of Social and Economic Networks "This is a great text, just at the right level for fourth-year undergraduates. The style is just right and the exercises are of high quality. Flow and organization are major strengths of the book--I can follow the text almost as is for the class I teach."--Luca Anderlini, Georgetown University "

Putting Auction Theory To Work


Author : Paul Milgrom
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2004-01-12



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This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.